Movies watched:
Shrek 3 by Chris Miller
Lives of others Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck
Reserver Dogs by Quentin Tarantino
Tiger and the snow by Roberto Benigni
Monster in Law
Arizona dream by Emir Kusturica
When father was away by Emir Kusturica
Capote by Bennette Miller
A one and a two (Yiyi) by Edward Yang
Dead man by Jim Jarmush
Alexander Nevsky by Sergei Eisenstein
Ivan the Terrible I by Sergei Eisenstein
Ivan the Terrible II by Sergei Eisenstein
Walk the line by James Mangold
Science of Sleep by Michel Gondry
12 angry men by Sidney Lumet
All quiet on the western front
Jarhead by Sam Mendes
Being John Malkovich
Draughtsman’s contract by Peter Greenaway
Born on 4th of July by Oliver Stone
Anything else by Woody Allen
Annie hall by Woody Allen
Sleeper by Woody Allen
Zelig by Woody Allen
Full metal Jacket by Stanley Kubrick
Odyssey 1968 by Stanley Kubrick
Lost in Translation by Sofia Coppola
Gandhi by Richard Attenborough
Paris Texas by Wim Wenders
Zatoichi
Dodesukaden by Aikiro Kurosawa
Kagemusha by Aikiro Kurosawa
Good bye Lenin by Wolfgang Becker
Volver by Almodovar
Finding Forrester
Chicago by Rob Marshall
Singing in the rain by Stanley Donne and Gene Kelly
The gospel according to St Matthew by Pisolini
Flags of our fathers by Clint Eastwood
Mystic river by Clint Eastwood
Letters from Iwo Jima by Clint Eastwood
Institute Benjamenta
Ichiban utsukushiku [videorecording] = Most beautiful by Akira Kurosawa
When a woman ascends the stairs by Mikio Naruse
Books read:
Soros on Soros
Chaos and Order in the Capital Market by Peter
Agricultural Price Policy in India
Trade LIberlization and Indian Agriculture
Kurosawa by Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto
Stumbling on Happiness by Danie
Shell Game by Stephen Kiesling
The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times And Ideas Of The Great Economic Thinkers by Robert Heilbroner
Winners and Losers from Microsoft Case
Metaphysics Club
Nietzsche Philosophical Biography
Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, Lectures adn Poems
Antitrust CASE
ANTITRUST
Antitrust and the Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses in the New Economy
p.1623: On April 3, 2000, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson declared that the Mircosoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) had maintained monopoly power in the personal computer operating system market by anticompetitive means, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antirust Act.
p.1624: In US v. Grinnell Corp., the Supreme Court distilled the monopolization offence of Section 2 into two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
Concept of monopoly power set forth in United States v. E.I du Pont de Nrmours&Co. “Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.”
p.1625: Once the relevant market is identified, evidence of monopoly power within that market must exist. Courts rely on several types of evidence in order to assess whether a firm enjoys such power. The most widely adopted approach is that a finding of dominant market share in conjunction with substantial barriers to entry is sufficient to create the presumption of monopoly power.
“Market share above seventy percent typically suffices to support an inference of monopoly power.”
p.1626: Barrier to entry + add fear it provides at low price.
In addition to monopoly power, under the Grinnell formulation courts must also find that there has been a “wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior propduct, business-acumen, or historic accident.”
Compete aggressively on the merits.
Distinguishing lawfully acquired and maintained monopoly power from objectionable monopoy power has been a difficult task for courts.
p.1627: In making a such a determination, many courts have inquired whether conduct htat is seemingly irrational for a profit-maximizing firm becomes rational only in light of its adverse impact on competition. “pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long run.”
p.1631: Lock in effects abound in IT markets, occurring whenever a consumer becomes so committed to a particular product that she cannot switch to a competing product without incurring significant costs. These switching costs can include the cost of acquiring new equipment or technology; the transaction cost of switching suppliers’ the cost of learning to use new equipment and functioning in the new technological environment; consumer uncertainty about ht equality of untested brands; foregone benefits of loyalty programs, such as frequent flyer programs; and psychological brand loyalty. To induce consumers to switch, the benefits of the new technology must outweigh these costs.
p.1634: The very nature of knowledge as a commodity naturally tends toward monopolization, or at least requires such for profitability. (to achieve such dominance, what is done is anticompetitive. NOT ON MERIT)
p.1635: network effects, which lead to the mass adoption of a standardized product, facilitate single-firm market dominance. Only one or a handful of networks tend to survive in any given market, meaning that the firm or firms behind such networkd will likely become dominant. (the table with numbers, it is possible but the error/complain is different for US gov)
p.1639: When they scrutinize a firm in a market characterized by network effects, regulators and courts should determine to what extent these effects cause market dominance. .. dominance that results from widespread consumer adoption of a technology is a natural and inevitable outcome in networdked markets.
p.1641: Lock-in effects – Consumer lock-in primarily impacts pricing and barrier to entry. Once a firm has developed a committed customer base, it is diffciutl for a challenger to dislodge those customers. … Lock-in effects are enhance by the dominant firsm’ competitive advantage derived from better access to consumer demographic information.
Exclusivity and Tying in US v. Microsoft: What we know and don’t know.
By Michael D. Whinston
p.64: Microsoft’s most visible act was the physical integration of Internet Explorer into Windows…. While these contracts rarely required complete exclusivity, they did require preferential treatment for Internet Explorer. Moreover, Microsoft often tied access to Windows to acceptance of these contracts…. They [OEMs] could not modify the boot sequence or have programs that automatically launch at its conclusion, which could give users an easy way to choose Navigator over Internet Explorer. [it was separate before in 1995]
Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, "Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price," Yale Law Journal, 96 (December 1986), pp. 209-293; link.
Yet at its core antitrust law is simple matter: It seeks, by prohiting undue collusion among competitors and unjustifiable exclusion of competing firms, to prevent compantes from obtaining and exercising the power to price above competitive levels. Collusion and exclusion are the twin objects of antitrust scrutiny, but they are not equally focused in the sights of antitrust enforcers and courts.
p. 214 we demonstrate that, in carefully defined circumstances, certain firms can attain monopoly power by making arrangements with their suppliers that place their competitors at a cost disadvantage. Our central argument is that claims of anticompetitve exclusion should be judged according to whether the challenged practice places rival competitors at cost disadvantage sufficient to allow the defendant firm to exercise monopoly power by raising its price.
First, one should ask whether the conduct of the challenged firm unavoidably and significantly increase the costs of its competitors. If so monopoly power possible – raise its price above the competitive level.
p.216 In each, the expressed fear is that, rather than enhancing competition by reducing costs or iumproving quality, the challenged practice may destroy competition by providing a few firsms with advantageous accesss to goods, markets, or customers, thereby enabling the advantaged few to gain power over price, quality, or output.
p.219 The terms and conditions under which goods are bought and sold, it is argued, are simply one of the ways in which firms compete. How, the critics ask, can an exclusive dealing or tying contract be labeled exclusionary when all firms may compete to obtain or offer such an agreement?
Goal of protecting agains the acquisition or enhancement of market power might justify the court’s results.
p.221 Given the lack of concentration and the absence of entry barriers in both shoe manufacturing and shoe retailing, vertical integration could not unduly disadvantage any firm.
p.224: Raising rival’s costs can be a particularly effective method of anticompetitive exclusion. This strategy need not entail sacrificing one’s own profits in the short run; it need not require classical market power as a preresquisite for its success; and it may give the excluding firm various options in exercising its acquired power.
Shrek 3 by Chris Miller
Lives of others Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck
Reserver Dogs by Quentin Tarantino
Tiger and the snow by Roberto Benigni
Monster in Law
Arizona dream by Emir Kusturica
When father was away by Emir Kusturica
Capote by Bennette Miller
A one and a two (Yiyi) by Edward Yang
Dead man by Jim Jarmush
Alexander Nevsky by Sergei Eisenstein
Ivan the Terrible I by Sergei Eisenstein
Ivan the Terrible II by Sergei Eisenstein
Walk the line by James Mangold
Science of Sleep by Michel Gondry
12 angry men by Sidney Lumet
All quiet on the western front
Jarhead by Sam Mendes
Being John Malkovich
Draughtsman’s contract by Peter Greenaway
Born on 4th of July by Oliver Stone
Anything else by Woody Allen
Annie hall by Woody Allen
Sleeper by Woody Allen
Zelig by Woody Allen
Full metal Jacket by Stanley Kubrick
Odyssey 1968 by Stanley Kubrick
Lost in Translation by Sofia Coppola
Gandhi by Richard Attenborough
Paris Texas by Wim Wenders
Zatoichi
Dodesukaden by Aikiro Kurosawa
Kagemusha by Aikiro Kurosawa
Good bye Lenin by Wolfgang Becker
Volver by Almodovar
Finding Forrester
Chicago by Rob Marshall
Singing in the rain by Stanley Donne and Gene Kelly
The gospel according to St Matthew by Pisolini
Flags of our fathers by Clint Eastwood
Mystic river by Clint Eastwood
Letters from Iwo Jima by Clint Eastwood
Institute Benjamenta
Ichiban utsukushiku [videorecording] = Most beautiful by Akira Kurosawa
When a woman ascends the stairs by Mikio Naruse
Books read:
Soros on Soros
Chaos and Order in the Capital Market by Peter
Agricultural Price Policy in India
Trade LIberlization and Indian Agriculture
Kurosawa by Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto
Stumbling on Happiness by Danie
Shell Game by Stephen Kiesling
The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times And Ideas Of The Great Economic Thinkers by Robert Heilbroner
Winners and Losers from Microsoft Case
Metaphysics Club
Nietzsche Philosophical Biography
Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, Lectures adn Poems
Antitrust CASE
ANTITRUST
Antitrust and the Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses in the New Economy
p.1623: On April 3, 2000, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson declared that the Mircosoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) had maintained monopoly power in the personal computer operating system market by anticompetitive means, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antirust Act.
p.1624: In US v. Grinnell Corp., the Supreme Court distilled the monopolization offence of Section 2 into two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
Concept of monopoly power set forth in United States v. E.I du Pont de Nrmours&Co. “Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.”
p.1625: Once the relevant market is identified, evidence of monopoly power within that market must exist. Courts rely on several types of evidence in order to assess whether a firm enjoys such power. The most widely adopted approach is that a finding of dominant market share in conjunction with substantial barriers to entry is sufficient to create the presumption of monopoly power.
“Market share above seventy percent typically suffices to support an inference of monopoly power.”
p.1626: Barrier to entry + add fear it provides at low price.
In addition to monopoly power, under the Grinnell formulation courts must also find that there has been a “wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior propduct, business-acumen, or historic accident.”
Compete aggressively on the merits.
Distinguishing lawfully acquired and maintained monopoly power from objectionable monopoy power has been a difficult task for courts.
p.1627: In making a such a determination, many courts have inquired whether conduct htat is seemingly irrational for a profit-maximizing firm becomes rational only in light of its adverse impact on competition. “pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long run.”
p.1631: Lock in effects abound in IT markets, occurring whenever a consumer becomes so committed to a particular product that she cannot switch to a competing product without incurring significant costs. These switching costs can include the cost of acquiring new equipment or technology; the transaction cost of switching suppliers’ the cost of learning to use new equipment and functioning in the new technological environment; consumer uncertainty about ht equality of untested brands; foregone benefits of loyalty programs, such as frequent flyer programs; and psychological brand loyalty. To induce consumers to switch, the benefits of the new technology must outweigh these costs.
p.1634: The very nature of knowledge as a commodity naturally tends toward monopolization, or at least requires such for profitability. (to achieve such dominance, what is done is anticompetitive. NOT ON MERIT)
p.1635: network effects, which lead to the mass adoption of a standardized product, facilitate single-firm market dominance. Only one or a handful of networks tend to survive in any given market, meaning that the firm or firms behind such networkd will likely become dominant. (the table with numbers, it is possible but the error/complain is different for US gov)
p.1639: When they scrutinize a firm in a market characterized by network effects, regulators and courts should determine to what extent these effects cause market dominance. .. dominance that results from widespread consumer adoption of a technology is a natural and inevitable outcome in networdked markets.
p.1641: Lock-in effects – Consumer lock-in primarily impacts pricing and barrier to entry. Once a firm has developed a committed customer base, it is diffciutl for a challenger to dislodge those customers. … Lock-in effects are enhance by the dominant firsm’ competitive advantage derived from better access to consumer demographic information.
Exclusivity and Tying in US v. Microsoft: What we know and don’t know.
By Michael D. Whinston
p.64: Microsoft’s most visible act was the physical integration of Internet Explorer into Windows…. While these contracts rarely required complete exclusivity, they did require preferential treatment for Internet Explorer. Moreover, Microsoft often tied access to Windows to acceptance of these contracts…. They [OEMs] could not modify the boot sequence or have programs that automatically launch at its conclusion, which could give users an easy way to choose Navigator over Internet Explorer. [it was separate before in 1995]
Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, "Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price," Yale Law Journal, 96 (December 1986), pp. 209-293; link.
Yet at its core antitrust law is simple matter: It seeks, by prohiting undue collusion among competitors and unjustifiable exclusion of competing firms, to prevent compantes from obtaining and exercising the power to price above competitive levels. Collusion and exclusion are the twin objects of antitrust scrutiny, but they are not equally focused in the sights of antitrust enforcers and courts.
p. 214 we demonstrate that, in carefully defined circumstances, certain firms can attain monopoly power by making arrangements with their suppliers that place their competitors at a cost disadvantage. Our central argument is that claims of anticompetitve exclusion should be judged according to whether the challenged practice places rival competitors at cost disadvantage sufficient to allow the defendant firm to exercise monopoly power by raising its price.
First, one should ask whether the conduct of the challenged firm unavoidably and significantly increase the costs of its competitors. If so monopoly power possible – raise its price above the competitive level.
p.216 In each, the expressed fear is that, rather than enhancing competition by reducing costs or iumproving quality, the challenged practice may destroy competition by providing a few firsms with advantageous accesss to goods, markets, or customers, thereby enabling the advantaged few to gain power over price, quality, or output.
p.219 The terms and conditions under which goods are bought and sold, it is argued, are simply one of the ways in which firms compete. How, the critics ask, can an exclusive dealing or tying contract be labeled exclusionary when all firms may compete to obtain or offer such an agreement?
Goal of protecting agains the acquisition or enhancement of market power might justify the court’s results.
p.221 Given the lack of concentration and the absence of entry barriers in both shoe manufacturing and shoe retailing, vertical integration could not unduly disadvantage any firm.
p.224: Raising rival’s costs can be a particularly effective method of anticompetitive exclusion. This strategy need not entail sacrificing one’s own profits in the short run; it need not require classical market power as a preresquisite for its success; and it may give the excluding firm various options in exercising its acquired power.
